

I-SEM 2028-29 T-4 Capacity Auction Independent Auction Monitor Report

Commission for Regulation of Utilities (CRU) and the
Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation
(NIAUR)

9th January 2025

AUCTION REPORT - REDACTED

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1. INDEPENDENT ASSURANCE REPORT

This report sets out our conclusions in relation to the monitoring of the processes and procedures followed by the System Operators (EirGrid and SONI Ltd; SOs) in conducting the Capacity Market Auction for the 2028/29 T-4 Capacity Auction, with respect to Capacity Auction Submissions submitted between 3rd December 2024 and 10:00 on 17th December 2024, to ensure that it has been correctly carried out in accordance with the SOs' obligations under the Capacity Market Code (CMC).

1.1. SCOPE OF THE REPORT

This report is produced in accordance with the terms of our engagement contract, dated 2nd September 2022, for the purposes of reporting to the Regulatory Authorities (RAs) – the Commission for Regulation of Utilities (CRU) and the Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation (UR) – in connection with CEPA's arrangement as the Capacity Auction Monitor for the I-SEM Capacity Market.

Under the CMC, the SOs have various obligations with respect to qualification for and conducting of the Capacity Auctions. These obligations apply to Capacity Auctions which the SOs are required to satisfy under the CMC. The SEM Committee's decision approving the CMC and its associated procedures are available here:

<https://www.semcommittee.com/news-centre/publication-i-sem-crm-capacity-market-code-decision>

The most up to date version of the CMC, and approved and pending modifications, are available here:

<https://www.sem-o.com/rules-and-modifications/capacity-market-modifications/market-rules/>

CEPA's role as the appointed Capacity Auction Monitor for the I-SEM is to provide independent assurance to the market and the Regulatory Authorities (RAs) that the SOs have correctly carried out their obligations under the CMC in respect of qualification for, and running of, the Capacity Auctions, as set out in the Terms of Reference for the Capacity Auction Monitor.²

We monitored the processes and procedures followed by the SOs for the Capacity Auction, as far as possible, in accordance with our Terms of Reference for this engagement. We provide our conclusions (in Section 1.4 below) in relation to compliance with the CMC based on our obligations. This report is provided in accordance with Section B.10.4 of the CMC, which sets out the requirement for the Capacity Auction Monitor to provide a report to the RAs:

- confirming the list of Participants with Capacity Market Units that have been allocated Awarded Capacity;
- stating whether or not the Capacity Auction Monitor considers that the Capacity Auction was conducted in accordance with this Code; and
- identifying any actual or potential non-compliance with the CMC by the SOs.

Note that, except where expressly stated, we did not audit or otherwise verify the information provided to us by the SOs in the course of our work. A separate Capacity Market Auditor is required to be in place under the CMC, with its obligations set out within the Capacity Market Auditor Terms of Reference. For the avoidance of doubt, CEPA would like to make clear that we are a professional economic advisory firm and not professional accountants.

1.2. OUR APPROACH

We developed a set of protocols and analytical tools to monitor the processes and procedures followed by the SOs for the Capacity Auction.

² SEM Committee (2017): 'Capacity Remuneration Mechanism – Terms of Reference for the Capacity Market Auditor and Capacity Auction Monitor', SEM-17-023.

In carrying out our duties, we have followed a system of quality control, professional conduct, and ethical behaviour which we consider to be of a standard at least as demanding as that required by ISAE 3000 (Revised). This includes documented policies and procedures related to our monitoring activities, leadership responsibilities for quality control in the firm, independence and ethical requirements and management of human resources.

We have performed our work as the appointed Capacity Auction Monitor based on our fundamental principles of integrity, objectivity, professional competence and due care, confidentiality, and professional behaviour.

1.3. INHERENT LIMITATIONS

Our conclusions are based on historical information. The projection of any information or conclusions in the attached report to any future periods would be inappropriate.

Our examination excludes audit procedures and accordingly we do not express an audit opinion on the information. We note that the procedures we performed were not designed to and are not likely to reveal fraud.

An outline of the work we performed for the Capacity Auction is included in Appendix A.

1.4. CONCLUSIONS

Our conclusions in this report reflect reasonable assurance in relation to the T-4 Capacity Auction for the 2028/29 Capacity Year.

We believe that the procedures performed, and the evidence obtained, provide us with a reasonable basis that, except for the matters described in Section 4 of our report, the Capacity Auction was conducted by the SOs in accordance with the requirements of the CMC.

Actual and potential instances of non-compliance are summarised in Section 4.

1.5. USE OF THE REPORT

This report has been prepared for the exclusive use of the RAs in accordance with the scope of our engagement contract and the RAs' Terms of Reference for the Capacity Auction Monitor.

Our work has been undertaken solely for the purpose of assessing that the SOs have correctly carried out the obligations placed on them under the CMC in carrying out the Capacity Auction. Our work was not planned or conducted with any other objective in mind, and so cannot be relied on for any other purpose. With the exception of providing it to the RAs and the SOs, and publishing it on the SEM Committee website, our report is not to be recited or referred to in any document, copied or made available (in whole or part) to any person without our prior written consent. To the fullest extent permitted by law, CEPA does not accept or assume responsibility to anyone, other than the RAs, for this report or for the conclusions we have formed.



Cambridge Economic Policy Associates Ltd
London, United Kingdom
9th January 2025

2. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

2.1. BACKGROUND

In the I-SEM Capacity Market, capacity providers sell qualified capacity to the market to meet the capacity requirement in a future capacity year. Capacity providers who are successful in the Capacity Auction receive a regular capacity payment that assists with funding generation capacity, and, in return, they have an obligation to generate when the system is stressed.

The operation of the Capacity Market and the roles and responsibilities of the market operator – split jointly between the SOs and the Single Electricity Market Operator (SEMO) – are governed by the CMC and the Trading and Settlement Code.

2.2. OUR ROLE AS CAPACITY AUCTION MONITOR

The Terms of Reference for the Capacity Auction Monitor state that:

“The purpose of the Capacity Auction Monitor is to provide independent assurance to the market and the Regulatory Authorities that the System Operators’ are correctly carrying out their obligations under the Capacity Market Code in respect of qualification for and running of Capacity Auctions.”

As Capacity Auction Monitor, we are required to produce a Report on the Capacity Auction, within two Working Days after the SOs have released provisional Capacity Auction Results to Participants, that:

- confirms the list of Participants with Capacity Market Units that have been allocated Awarded Capacity;
- states whether or not the Capacity Auction Monitor considers that the Capacity Auction was conducted in accordance with the CMC; and
- where applicable, identifies any actual or potential non-compliance with the CMC or other actual or potential irregularity in the conduct of the Capacity Auction, together with the Capacity Auction Monitor’s assessment as to the likely consequences of the actual or potential non-compliance or irregularity.

This report summarises our findings in relation to the Capacity Auction run by the SOs on 17th January 2024.

2.3. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

The CMC paragraph B.10.2.1 sets out that:

“The Capacity Auction Monitor shall monitor the processes and procedures followed by the System Operators in carrying out the Qualification Process, conducting Capacity Auctions and related activities under this Code, in accordance with the terms of reference determined by the Regulatory Authorities.”

The basic tasks set out for the Capacity Auction Monitor are:

- monitoring the Qualification Process to ensure that the SOs have complied with the CMC;
- being present at the auctions, with full read access to all key software, including access to all bids and all communications between the SOs and all bidders;
- monitoring the application of algorithms and calculations;
- reporting on whether it considers that the SOs have conducted the Capacity Auction in accordance with the CMC;

- identifying any actual or potential breach of the rules and regulations or other actual or potential irregularities in the conduct of the Capacity Auction by the SOs and an assessment of the consequences; and
- making recommendations on the changes to the CMC, Auction Guidelines and User Guides.

As Capacity Auction Monitor, we are required to report on all issues that we identify, irrespective of materiality.

The scope of the Capacity Auction Monitor's assurance activities shall relate to the System Operators' activities relating to qualification through to the determination of the final auction results under the Code.

2.4. SCOPE EXCLUSIONS

In line with our Terms of Reference, the scope of our review excluded the following:

- Secondary trading market (referenced specifically within Chapter H of the CMC).
- Direct investigation of market manipulation: However, the Terms of Reference states that the Capacity Auction Monitor should bring any incidents of potential market manipulation to the attention of the RAs, should it come across them in carrying out its duties.
- The determination of the LCCs and their underlying methodology: The Capacity Auction Monitor's scope in relation to LCCs is limited to assessing compliance by the SOs with the methodology for determining LCCs, including accordance with relevant procedures and process documentation.
- Auditing of the processes carried out by the SOs: The CMC requires a Capacity Market Auditor to be appointed separately from the Capacity Auction Monitor. Under our Terms of Reference, we are not required to carry out an audit of the processes followed, or information provided, by the SOs in running the auction.
- Monitoring of compliance with obligations of Section L.7 of the CMC regarding SO reporting of REMIT Data on behalf of Participants.

3. AUCTION RESULTS

The Capacity Auction Submission Commencement date for the T-4 Auction was 3rd December 2024, on the date planned in the Capacity Auction Timetables version 1.4. The SOs emailed Participants at 16:41 to inform them that the auction gate had opened at 16:30. The Capacity Auction Submission End took place at 10:00 on 17th December 2024.

Capacity Auction Run Start was scheduled for 12:00 on 17th December 2024 (CAT v1.4). Auction Run was initiated at this time and was completed within a minute of initiation. The auction clearing process was completed within the 24-hour Allowed Timeframe.

The Capacity Auction was run using the Capacity Market Platform (CMP) version 3.3.3.1, according to information displayed in the CMP.

In line with the Final Auction Information Pack (FAIP), the parameters of the Demand Curve used in the 2028/29 T-4 Auction are set out in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Final Demand Curve used in the Capacity Auction, same as in FAIP 2028/29 T-4 Table 1

De-Rated Capacity (MW)	Demand Curve Point (€/MW per year)
0	230,000
3,761	230,000
4,899	111,356
5,967	0

The minimum and maximum capacity needed to satisfy the LCCs were as set out in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: LCCs and minimum MW required, same as in FAIP 2028/29 T-4 Tables 4 and 5

LCC Area 1 Name	Minimum Required Quantity (MW)	Maximum Required Quantity (MW)	LCC Area 2 Name	Minimum Required Quantity (MW)	Maximum Required Quantity (MW)
L1-1: Northern Ireland	2,207	20,000			
L1-2: Ireland	7,440	20,000	L2-1: Greater Dublin	2,379	2,379

There were 192 offers for 149 CMUs in this Capacity Auction. This is out of a total of 255 qualified CMUs, 98 of which had Existing Capacity with a non-zero Firm Offer Requirement (and thus were required to submit offers). Of these, 81 had only Existing Capacity available to offer, and 17 had both Existing and New Capacity available to offer into this Capacity Auction. There were a further 28 CMUs that had a non-zero Firm Offer Requirement comprising only New Capacity, and therefore (under CMC F.2.1.1) these CMUs were not required to submit an offer. Only 1 of these CMUs did submit an offer.

189 offers were submitted directly by the relevant Participants, with 3 offers generated automatically by the Capacity Market Operator (CMO).

A total of 5,942.494 MW cleared in the auction, with 141 CMUs being awarded all their offered capacity.

The Auction Clearing Price was determined in accordance with CMC F.8.3. The Price Setting Offer was an Inflexible offer cleared at €149,960.00/MW per year (£135,308.91/MW per year). This is greater than the Existing Capacity Price Cap (€55,678.00/£50,956.51 per MWh).

For the determination of the Auction Clearing Price, a total of [] offers were initially scheduled. The offered quantity scheduled at the Auction Clearing Price was not sufficient to meet the LCC Required Quantities for Northern Ireland, Ireland, or Greater Dublin (as it was not implemented in this auction, an implied L2-2: Rest of

CMU ID	Capacity type(s) offered by this CMU	LCC Level 1	LCC Level 2	Offered Quantity (MW)	Cleared Q during Auction Clearing Price determination (MW)	Cleared Q in Auction Solution (MW)	Difference (MW)
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
Total							[X]

Based on the outcome of the T-4 Auction, Table 3.5 lists the participants and corresponding CMUs that have been awarded capacity.

3.1. CMUs PROVISIONALLY AWARDED CAPACITY IN THIS CAPACITY AUCTION

Table 3.5: List of participants and CMUs provisionally awarded capacity in the T-4 Capacity Auction for the Capacity Year 2028/29

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	Candidate Unit ID	Technology class	LCC Area Level 1	LCC Area Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered	Quantity awarded
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400030	CAU_400301	Hydro	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[∞]	190.293
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400033	CAU_400302	Wind	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[∞]	5.068
SSE Airtricity Limited	PY_000021	PT_400021	CAU_400500	Wind	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[∞]	11.363
Orsted Ireland Green Energy Limited	PY_000068	PT_400062	CAU_400502	Wind	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[∞]	9.054
EnerNOC Ireland Ltd	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_401270	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[∞]	8.276
Electricity Exchange DAC t/a VIOTAS	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_401400	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing and New	[∞]	5.248
Veolia Alternative Energy Ireland Limited	PY_000122	PT_400124	DSU_401490	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[∞]	4.682
GridBeyond Limited (formerly Endeco Technologies Limited)	PY_000126	PT_400133	DSU_401530	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing and New	[∞]	6.199
EnerNOC Ireland Ltd	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_401610	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[∞]	2.540
EnerNOC Ireland Ltd	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_401620	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[∞]	2.039
Powerhouse Generation Limited	PY_000128	PT_400144	DSU_401660	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[∞]	0.720
EnerNOC Ireland Ltd	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_401800	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[∞]	1.902
Electricity Exchange DAC t/a VIOTAS	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_401870	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing and New	[∞]	21.580

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	Candidate Unit ID	Technology class	LCC Area Level 1	LCC Area Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered	Quantity awarded
Veolia Alternative Energy Ireland Limited	PY_000122	PT_400124	DSU_401880	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[X]	11.000
GridBeyond Limited (formerly Endeco Technologies Limited)	PY_000126	PT_400133	DSU_401910	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	7.739
Electricity Exchange DAC t/a VIOTAS	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_402090	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing and New	[X]	12.140
Electricity Exchange DAC t/a VIOTAS	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_402100	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing and New	[X]	11.531
Electricity Exchange DAC t/a VIOTAS	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_402120	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing and New	[X]	8.981
GridBeyond Limited (formerly Endeco Technologies Limited)	PY_000126	PT_400133	DSU_402180	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing and New	[X]	2.490
EnerNOC Ireland Ltd	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_403020	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[X]	1.946
EnerNOC Ireland Ltd	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_403030	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[X]	2.053
EnerNOC Ireland Ltd	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_403040	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[X]	2.057
EnerNOC Ireland Ltd	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_403050	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[X]	1.978
EnerNOC Ireland Ltd	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_403080	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	0.061
EnerNOC Ireland Ltd	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_403120	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	2.587
EnerNOC Ireland Ltd	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_403450	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	2.895

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	Candidate Unit ID	Technology class	LCC Area Level 1	LCC Area Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered	Quantity awarded
EnerNOC Ireland Ltd	PY_000088	PT_400090	DSU_403470	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	2.005
Powerhouse Generation Limited	PY_000128	PT_400144	DSU_403500	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing and New	[X]	5.425
Electricity Exchange DAC t/a VIOTAS	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_403520	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing and New	[X]	8.326
Electricity Exchange DAC t/a VIOTAS	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_403560	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing and New	[X]	21.460
GridBeyond Limited (formerly Endeco Technologies Limited)	PY_000126	PT_400133	DSU_403590	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	0.616
Electricity Exchange DAC t/a VIOTAS	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_403630	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing and New	[X]	20.856
iPower Solutions Ltd	PY_000093	PT_402574	DSU_403650	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing and New	[X]	3.854
GridBeyond Limited (formerly Endeco Technologies Limited)	PY_000126	PT_400133	DSU_403690	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[X]	0.664
GridBeyond Limited (formerly Endeco Technologies Limited)	PY_000126	PT_400133	DSU_403750	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	0.512
GridBeyond Limited (formerly Endeco Technologies Limited)	PY_000126	PT_400133	DSU_403770	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	New	[X]	0.051
Aughinish Alumina Ltd	PY_000024	PT_400024	DSU_403790	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	15.025
Powerhouse Generation Limited	PY_000128	PT_400144	DSU_403800	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	3.070

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	Candidate Unit ID	Technology class	LCC Area Level 1	LCC Area Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered	Quantity awarded
Powerhouse Generation Limited	PY_000128	PT_400144	DSU_403810	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	3.070
Electricity Exchange DAC t/a VIOTAS	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_403830	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	15.881
Electricity Exchange DAC t/a VIOTAS	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_403850	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	12.981
Electricity Exchange DAC t/a VIOTAS	PY_000114	PT_400116	DSU_403860	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	2.456
Critical Mass	PY_034206	PT_402564	DSU_403890	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	6.139
Critical Mass	PY_034206	PT_402564	DSU_403900	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	6.133
Critical Mass	PY_034206	PT_402564	DSU_403910	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	6.139
Critical Mass	PY_034206	PT_402564	DSU_403920	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	6.139
Critical Mass	PY_034206	PT_402564	DSU_403930	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	6.133
Critical Mass	PY_034206	PT_402564	DSU_403940	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	6.139
Critical Mass	PY_034206	PT_402564	DSU_403970	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	New	[X]	0.521
Crag Digital Avoca Limited	PY_034122	PT_402600	DSU_404000	Demand Side Unit	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	40.000
AC Automation (UK) Ltd	PY_000109	PT_500064	DSU_501200	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	4.682
Powerhouse Generation Limited	PY_000128	PT_500078	DSU_501330	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	1.209

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	Candidate Unit ID	Technology class	LCC Area Level 1	LCC Area Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered	Quantity awarded
Energy Trading Ireland Limited	PY_000113	PT_500067	DSU_501380	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	2.478
GridBeyond Limited (formerly Endeco Technologies Limited)	PY_000126	PT_500099	DSU_501460	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	3.013
Energy Trading Ireland Limited	PY_000113	PT_500067	DSU_501510	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	3.402
Powerhouse Generation Limited	PY_000128	PT_500078	DSU_501560	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing and New	[X]	3.435
Energy Trading Ireland Limited	PY_000113	PT_500067	DSU_501600	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	3.737
iPower Solutions Ltd	PY_000093	PT_500053	DSU_503420	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	2.661
iPower Solutions Ltd	PY_000093	PT_500053	DSU_503450	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	6.049
Electricity Exchange DAC t/a VIOTAS	PY_000114	PT_502516	DSU_503460	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing and New	[X]	4.858
iPower Solutions Ltd	PY_000093	PT_500053	DSU_503480	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	3.315
GridBeyond Limited (formerly Endeco Technologies Limited)	PY_000126	PT_500099	DSU_503650	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	1.134
Powerhouse Generation Limited	PY_000128	PT_500078	DSU_503660	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	New	[X]	3.070
Durham Street Energy	PY_034207	PT_502568	DSU_503690	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	New	[X]	4.912
Durham Street Energy	PY_034207	PT_502568	DSU_503700	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	New	[X]	2.456

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	Candidate Unit ID	Technology class	LCC Area Level 1	LCC Area Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered	Quantity awarded
Durham Street Energy	PY_034207	PT_502568	DSU_503710	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	New	[X]	3.070
Durham Street Energy	PY_034207	PT_502568	DSU_503720	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	New	[X]	3.070
LCC Trading and Mineral Ltd	PY_034216	PT_502570	DSU_503730	Demand Side Unit	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	New	[X]	6.140
Aughinish Alumina Ltd	PY_000024	PT_400024	GU_400120	Autoproducer	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	55.380
Aughinish Alumina Ltd	PY_000024	PT_400024	GU_400121	Autoproducer	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	55.380
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400030	GU_400181	Gas Turbine - IED	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	76.410
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400030	GU_400182	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	76.410
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400030	GU_400183	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	76.410
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400030	GU_400324	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[X]	195.600
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400030	GU_400325	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[X]	192.340
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400030	GU_400360	Pumped Hydro Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	30.879
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400030	GU_400361	Pumped Hydro Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	30.879
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400030	GU_400362	Pumped Hydro Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	30.879
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400030	GU_400363	Pumped Hydro Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	30.879
Huntstown Power Company	PY_000033	PT_400035	GU_400480	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[X]	267.444
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400037	GU_400500	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Both existing and new	[X]	315.400

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	Candidate Unit ID	Technology class	LCC Area Level 1	LCC Area Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered	Quantity awarded
TYNAGH ENERGY LIMITED	PY_000041	PT_400041	GU_400530	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	306.400
Energia Power Generation Limited	PY_000044	PT_400044	GU_400540	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[X]	306.400
SSE Generation Ireland Limited	PY_000071	PT_400064	GU_400762	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	345.216
SSE Generation Ireland Limited	PY_000071	PT_400064	GU_400770	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	44.185
SSE Generation Ireland Limited	PY_000071	PT_400064	GU_400771	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	44.185
SSE Generation Ireland Limited	PY_000071	PT_400064	GU_400780	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	44.356
SSE Generation Ireland Limited	PY_000071	PT_400064	GU_400781	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	44.356
ESB	PY_000030	PT_400030	GU_400850	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	325.796
Bord Gais ROI	PY_000027	PT_400028	GU_400930	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	333.000
Indaver Energy Limited	PY_000101	PT_400087	GU_401230	Steam Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	10.353
Dublin Waste to Energy Supply Limited	PY_000152	PT_400198	GU_402030	Steam Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-1: Greater Dublin	Existing	[X]	36.039
Ronaver Energy Limited	PY_000194	PT_400460	GU_403000	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	1.768
Statkraft Markets GmbH	PY_034046	PT_402540	GU_404010	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	0.079
Orsted Ireland Green Energy Limited	PY_000068	PT_400062	GU_404200	Wind	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	1.260
Orsted Ireland Green Energy Limited	PY_000068	PT_400062	GU_404210	Wind	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	2.380

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	Candidate Unit ID	Technology class	LCC Area Level 1	LCC Area Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered	Quantity awarded
Lumcloon Power Limited	PY_034098	PT_402579	GU_404360	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Both existing and new	[X]	2.360
Lumcloon Power Limited	PY_034098	PT_402579	GU_404370	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Both existing and new	[X]	2.360
Shannonbridge Power Limited	PY_034099	PT_402580	GU_404380	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	2.360
Shannonbridge Power Limited	PY_034099	PT_402580	GU_404390	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	2.360
Statkraft Markets GmbH	PY_034046	PT_402540	GU_404520	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	0.181
Orsted Ireland Green Energy Limited	PY_000068	PT_400062	GU_404800	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	7.170
Statkraft Markets GmbH	PY_034046	PT_402540	GU_405070	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	2.063
Axpo UK Limited	PY_034070	PT_402560	GU_405930	Wind	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	1.685
Rhode LDES Ltd	PY_034201	PT_402649	GU_406750	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	8.860
Rhode LDES Ltd	PY_034201	PT_402649	GU_406760	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	8.860
Bord Gais ROI	PY_000027	PT_400028	GU_406860	Gas Turbine	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	262.190
Origin Energy Limited	PY_034205	PT_402653	GU_407020	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	15.800
Ballysumaghan Flexpower Ltd	PY_034209	PT_402656	GU_407060	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	25.200
Drumkee LCIS Ltd	PY_034212	PT_402658	GU_407080	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	14.100
Gortahile Wind farm Limited	PY_034221	PT_402664	GU_407230	Wind	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	1.120
Hazelboro Limited	PY_034166	PT_402628	GU_407240	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	4.891
Hazelboro Limited	PY_034166	PT_402628	GU_407270	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	4.891

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	Candidate Unit ID	Technology class	LCC Area Level 1	LCC Area Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered	Quantity awarded
Hazelboro Limited	PY_034166	PT_402628	GU_407280	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	2.190
Rengen Power	PY_034218	PT_402663	GU_407300	Wind	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	0.963
Tra Investments Ltd	PY_034224	PT_402665	GU_407310	Wind	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	0.744
Energia Customer Solutions Limited	PY_000043	PT_400043	GU_407400	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	4.410
Energia Customer Solutions Limited	PY_000043	PT_400043	GU_407490	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	6.825
Energia Customer Solutions Limited	PY_000043	PT_400043	GU_407500	Other Storage	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	10.840
ESB	PY_000030	PT_500024	GU_500040	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	318.316
ESB	PY_000030	PT_500024	GU_500041	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	44.785
EP BALLYLUMFORD LIMITED	PY_000056	PT_500040	GU_500283	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	49.133
EP BALLYLUMFORD LIMITED	PY_000056	PT_500040	GU_500284	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	49.133
EP KILROOT LIMITED	PY_000070	PT_500045	GU_500820	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	35.660
EP KILROOT LIMITED	PY_000070	PT_500045	GU_500821	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	35.660
EP KILROOT LIMITED	PY_000070	PT_500045	GU_500824	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	25.346
EP KILROOT LIMITED	PY_000070	PT_500045	GU_500825	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	25.346
iPower Solutions Ltd	PY_000093	PT_500053	GU_501130	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	55.327

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	Candidate Unit ID	Technology class	LCC Area Level 1	LCC Area Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered	Quantity awarded
Empower Generation Limited	PY_000111	PT_500073	GU_501230	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	11.283
EP BALLYLUMFORD LIMITED	PY_000056	PT_500040	GU_503720	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	200.402
EP BALLYLUMFORD LIMITED	PY_000056	PT_500040	GU_503730	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	200.402
EP BALLYLUMFORD LIMITED	PY_000056	PT_500040	GU_503740	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	82.667
Statkraft Markets GmbH	PY_034046	PT_502514	GU_503950	Other Storage	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	1.376
Statkraft Markets GmbH	PY_034046	PT_502514	GU_503960	Other Storage	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	1.376
Orsted Onshore Green Energy NI Limited	PY_000168	PT_500110	GU_504200	Wind	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	0.901
Heron Storage BESS	PY_034181	PT_502562	GU_504250	Other Storage	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	New	[X]	1.809
Heron Storage BESS	PY_034181	PT_502562	GU_504280	Other Storage	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	New	[X]	2.516
SSE Derrymeen BESS Limited	PY_034219	PT_502571	GU_504310	Other Storage	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	New	[X]	14.100
Lagan Energy Ballymena	PY_034222	PT_502573	GU_504320	Gas Turbine	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	New	[X]	4.420
Moyle Interconnector Limited	IO_MOYLE	IO_MOYLE	I_NIMOYLE	Interconnector	L1-1: Northern Ireland	N/A	Existing	[X]	240.750
EIRGRID INTERCONNECTOR DESIGNATED ACTIVITY COMPANY	IO_EIDAC	IO_EIDAC	I_ROIEWIC	Interconnector	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	Existing	[X]	265.000

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	Candidate Unit ID	Technology class	LCC Area Level 1	LCC Area Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered	Quantity awarded
Greenlink Interconnector Limited	IO_GRNLK	IO_GRNLK	I_ROIGRLK	Interconnector	L1-2: Ireland	L2-2: Rest of Ireland	New	[X]	11.592

3.2. CMUs PROVISIONALLY NOT AWARDED CAPACITY IN THIS CAPACITY AUCTION

The Participant listed in Table 3.6 submitted an offer for a CMU in the T-4 Auction but was not awarded any capacity.

Table 3.6: List of participants and CMUs provisionally awarded **no** capacity in the T-4 Capacity Auction for the Capacity Year 2028/29

Party Name	Party ID	Participant ID	CMU ID	Technology class	LCC Level 1	LCC Level 2	Capacity Type	Quantity offered (MW)	Quantity awarded (MW)
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	0.000
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	0.000
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	0.000
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	0.000
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	0.000
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	0.000
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	0.000

4. SUMMARY OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED WITH THE CAPACITY AUCTION PROCESS

We performed our role as Capacity Auction Monitor in relation to the 2028/29 T-4 Capacity Auction, which took place on 17th December 2024, in line with our obligations to monitor the conduct of the SOs in operating the Capacity Auctions. In Section 4.1, we summarise the identified instances of non-compliance within the areas of the CMC that are in the Capacity Auction Monitor's scope, before presenting some additional considerations in Section 4.2.

4.1. SUMMARY OF ISSUES

In carrying out our duties, we identified **13 issues** that we consider constitute non-compliance with the CMC, noting our obligation to report all issues to the RAs irrespective of materiality. The table below sets out a high-level summary of actual or potential instances of non-compliance identified within the Capacity Auction process. Detailed issue logs are included in Appendix B.

Table 4.1: Summary of issues identified within the Capacity Auction process⁴

Issue Log	Description
016	The SOs did not include the 'final Capacity Auction Threshold for the Capacity Auction' in the Final Auction Information Pack, as is required under CMC F.5.1.3. We do not consider this to have had an impact on the Auction.
017	The Initial Capacity values for a number of generators within one CMU are not equal to the values submitted in the Participant's applications and no "Amend code" has been provided in the Final Qualification Results to explain these differences. We consider this to be non-compliant with CMC E.8.1. We do not consider this to have had a material impact on the auction given it is a communication issue
018	CMC Section E.8.2 sets out the approach to calculating Gross De-Rated Capacity (Existing). For several Generator Units, the value of Gross De-Rated Capacity (Existing) in the FQRs does not align with the values calculated through the application of the formula outlined in this section of the CMC. The calculated values were incorrect by 1 decimal place. Based on this, we determine it is unlikely that it had a material impact on the auction.
019	CMC section E.8.2.4 sets out how the SOs shall determine the Gross De-Rated Capacity (New) (GDRCN) of a Generator Unit or Interconnector. For several units, the GDRCN has not been determined according to this section of the CMC. As the calculated values were incorrect by a small magnitude, there was no material impact on the auction.
020	For the 2028/2029 T-4 Capacity Auction, the notification of the outcome of the Applications for Review was not completed by the SOs within the Prescribed Timeframe as set out within the applicable version of the Capacity Auction Timetable at the time (version 1.1), resulting in non-compliance with code E.9.3.5 of the CMC. This did not have a material impact on the auction.
021	CMC section E.8.5.1 sets out the calculation of the Firm Offer Requirement. We find there to be a number of cases of non-compliance relating to the incorrect calculation of the Firm Offer Requirement. We have not identified any instances where the errors had a material impact on the auction.
023	CMC section E.8.2.5 sets out how the SOs shall determine the Gross De-Rated Capacity (New) of a Generator Unit or Interconnector. For two units the GDRCN has not been determined in accordance with this section of the CMC. We do not believe this to have had a material impact on the auction, given that the difference is to 1 decimal place, and therefore appears to be a rounding difference.

⁴ Issue numbers are assigned to potential instances of non-compliance as they are identified. Issue numbers missing from the table (e.g., Issue 022) may reflect issues investigated as part of the Capacity Auction Monitor's Qualification Report for this Auction or may reflect issues that have been investigated and determined not to represent non-compliance with the CMC.

Issue Log	Description
024	<p>CMC Sections E.8.2.7 and E.8.2.8 provide the formulas to be used in the determination of Gross De-Rated Capacity (Existing) and Gross De-Rated Capacity (New) of Aggregated Generator Units. For several Aggregated Generator Units, the Gross De-Rated Capacity values within the FQRs do not align with the values calculated through the application of the formulas outlined in this section. As these differences are small in magnitude, we do not believe there was any material impact on the auction.</p> <p>CMC Section E.8.3.1 provides the approach for calculating the Net De-rated Capacity Existing. We find one unit where the values in the FQRs do not align with the values calculated through the application of the formulas outlined in this paragraph. In this case, the SOs took action such that this did not have an impact on the capacity offered into the auction.</p>
025	<p>The SOs did not reduce the Locational Capacity Constraint (LCC) Required Quantity to the Total Quantity determined under paragraph F.4.1.1.(b), as is required under CMC F.4.1.6. This did not have an impact on the auction.</p>
026	<p>We have found several issues of non-compliance with CMC E.8.5.2 relating to the calculated Firm Offer Requirements for DSUs. This was related to the code change in the CMC between versions 11 and version 12 for E.8.5.2, impacting the calculation of the Firm Offer Requirement values, not yet being reflected in the CMP. This was communicated to the affected DSUs by the SOs through the use of a Qualification Note. This did not have an impact on the auction.</p>
027	<p>There were a number of changes between Provisional Qualification Decisions and Final Qualification decisions, for which the reasons were not explained to Participants through the FQRs, as is required by CMC E.9.4.11. We did not find any instances where this had a material impact on the auction.</p>
028	<p>Section E.7.8 of the CMC outlines the Alternative Qualification Process (AQP) which the SOs are to apply under certain circumstances. In the FQRs, the SOs have not applied this process in some instances in accordance with E.7.8.2. In two cases, this did not have a material impact on the auction.</p> <p>In one case, the SOs have applied a 5-year Maximum Contract Duration based on the RAs approval of an Exception Application instead of the one-year duration specified in the CMC for units qualified through the AQP. The unit was awarded a 5-year contract in the auction therefore the decision to assign a Maximum Capacity Duration of 5 years had a material impact on the capacity contract duration for this unit, but not on the auction clearing price and quantity.</p>
029	<p>CMC sections F.4.1.4 and F.4.1.5 relate to the submission of Locational Capacity Constraint (LCC) determinations to the RAs. We find the SOs did not make a submission under F.4.1.4 and that the submission under F.4.1.5 was later than the date stated in the CMC. Neither of these issues had any material impact on the auction.</p>

4.2. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS

This sub-section contains comments and observations that we believe do not represent non-compliance with the CMC, but we consider it appropriate to summarise for the RAs' attention.

4.2.1. Submission of FQDs to the RAs for approval

CMC E.9.4.4 states that the SOs shall use reasonable endeavours to submit the Final Qualification Decisions (FQDs) to the RAs for approval by the date set out within the Capacity Auction Timetable (CAT).

The relevant date for submission of the FQDs to the RAs was 15/10/24 as per version 1.1 of the CAT. The SOs did send the FQDs to the RAs for approval on 15/10/24 in line with the CMC. However, the SOs also sent updated files on two occasions following this date, as set out below.

- On 23/10/23 an updated FQD file was sent to the RAs to:
 - Give effect of the RA draft decisions (as per 25/09/24) for the Units that had been provisionally approved for a 5-year Intermediate Length Contract.
 - Inclusion of all 'REJECT' comments for all GUs, as some units did not have the full comments included due to a truncation issue.

- On 29/11/24 a further updated FQD file was sent to the RAs to:
 - Ensure the Firm Offer Requirement for each DSU is equal to the Net De-Rated Capacity (Existing).
 - Update the Existing and New Net De-Rated Capacity for [X] to account for an error regarding the calculation of the Full Load Hours of the Battery.

While the FQDs were initially submitted to the RAs in line with the CAT, and therefore do not represent non-compliance with the CMC, two further submissions were provided to the RAs following the deadline set out in the CAT to make corrections to the initial submission. Our view is that the SOs should endeavour to provide correct and final FQDs to the RAs in line with the timeline set out in the CAT, but we note that this had no material impact on the Capacity Auction.

4.2.2. Rounding of Published Quantities

CMC paragraph L.5.4.1 requires the SOs to use consistent numerical rounding of all published quantities.

We note that a number of values in the FAIP and CAT for 2028/29 T-4 are reported to a smaller number of decimal places. In addition, a number of values in the Auction Results displayed on the CMP are also reported to a smaller number of decimal places for MW values.

Instances where the SOs have published values to fewer decimal places do not necessarily constitute non-compliance, as applying the convention of dropping zeros after the decimal point if not followed by non-zero values is a consistent approach, but could cause ambiguity. We also raised this in our 2027/78 T-4 and 2023/24 T-1 Auction Reports.

To rule out ambiguity and to align with the CMC, the SOs should consider publishing values to the specified number of decimal places for all published documents going forward.

Appendix A SUMMARY OF WORK PERFORMED

Our fieldwork was completed on the 17th December 2024 at the System Operators' premises at The Oval, Shelbourne Road, Dublin. Additional members of the CAM team also observed the process for this Auction using conference calling and screen-sharing. The areas of the Code checked at the time of issuing this report are outlined in the table below.

Table A.1: Summary of CMC sections checked by the Capacity Auction Monitor in preparing this report

CMC Chapter	CMC Subsection	CMC Paragraph		
C. De-Rating and Capacity Concepts	C.2 Locational Capacity Constraints	C.2.1.2		
		C.2.2.2		
		C.2.3.1		
		C.2.3.2		
	C.3 Initial Capacity	C.3.2.1		
		C.3.2.3		
		C.3.2.4		
		C.3.5.1		
		D. Pre-Capacity Auction Process	D.2 Capacity Auctions and Timetables	D.2.1.5
				D.2.1.9
D.2.1.10				
D.2.1.11				
D.2.1.14				
D.2.1.16				
D.2.1.17				
E. Qualification	E.1 Purpose of Qualification Process	E.1.1.4		
	E.4 Application for Qualification	E.4.1.8		
	E.5 Exception Applications	E.5.1.10		
	E.7 Requirements for Qualification	E.7.8.1		
		E.7.8.2		
	E.8 Qualification Calculations	E.8.1.1		
		E.8.1.2		
		E.8.1.3		
		E.8.2.1		
		E.8.2.2		
		E.8.2.4		
		E.8.2.5		
		E.8.2.7		
		E.8.2.8		
		E.8.3.1		
		E.8.4.1		
		E.8.5.1		
		E.8.5.2		
	E.8.6.1			
	E.8.7.1			
E.8.8.1				
E.8.8.2				
E.8.8.3				
E.8.9.1				
E.8.9.2				

CMC Chapter	CMC Subsection	CMC Paragraph
	E.9 Notification of Qualification Decisions	E.9.3.3
		E.9.3.5
		E.9.3.6
E. Qualification	E.9 Notification of Qualification Decisions	E.9.4.1
		E.9.4.2
		E.9.4.3
		E.9.4.4
		E.9.4.9
		E.9.4.10
		E.9.4.11
		E.9.5.1
F. Capacity Auctions	F.1 General	F.1.2.2
	F.2. Capacity Auction Participation	F.2.1.1
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		F.8.3.5
		F.8.4.2
		F.8.4.3
		F.8.4.4
		F.8.4.5
		F.8.4.6
		F.8.4.7
		F.8.5.1
		F.8.6.1
	F.9 Capacity Auction Results	F.9.1.1

CMC Chapter	CMC Subsection	CMC Paragraph
		F.9.2.1
		F.9.3.1
K. Exchange Rates	K.2 Methodology	K.2.1.6
L. Data and Information Systems	L.2 Methodology	L.2.2.2
		L.2.3.1
		L.2.4.3
		L.2.4.4
		L.2.5.1
		L.2.5.2
		L.2.5.3
		L.2.5.4
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	L.3 Submission, Validation and Rejection of Data Transactions	L.3.1.1
		L.3.1.3
		L.3.1.6
		L.3.1.7
		L.3.1.8
	L.4 Communications Failures	L.4.2.1
		L.4.2.3
		L.4.3.1
		L.4.3.3
		L.4.3.4
		L.4.4.2
		L.4.4.3
	L.5 Data Publication	L.5.4.1

Appendix B **SUMMARIES OF OBSERVED ISSUES RESULTING FROM THE CAPACITY AUCTION PROCESS**

B.1. ISSUE LOG 016

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
016	2028/2029 T-4 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-Compliant
Summary			
<p>The SOs did not include the ‘final Capacity Auction Threshold for the Capacity Auction’ in the Final Auction Information Pack, as is required under CMC F.5.1.3.</p>			
Description of Issue			
<p>As per CMC F.5.1.2, the SOs are required to publish a Final Auction Information Pack (FAIP) for each Capacity Auction that includes the items listed under CMC F.5.1.3.</p> <p>In the FAIP for the 2028/2029 T-4 Capacity Auction, published on 7th November 2024, the SOs did not include F.5.1.3 (q), ‘<i>the final Capacity Auction Threshold for the Capacity Auction</i>’, as is required.</p>			
Capacity Auction Monitor’s Comments			
<p>We consider this to be non-compliance with CMC F.5.1.3.</p> <p>We do not consider this to have an impact on the Auction.</p> <p>We also note that the Capacity Auction Threshold is not defined in the CMC and is not listed as a requirement for inclusion in the IAIP. Under CMC D.3.1.2, the SOs are required to include a Capacity Aggregation Threshold for the Capacity Auction, as determined by the RAs, in the IAIP.</p> <p>We recommend that the CMC be updated to clarify if the Capacity Auction Threshold referred to in CMC.F.5.1.3 is the same as the Capacity Aggregation Threshold mentioned in CMC D.3.1.2, or alternatively, define the Capacity Auction Threshold in the CMC.</p>			
SO Comments			
<p>The SOs explained to the CAM that the RAs did not approve a Capacity Aggregation Threshold for this auction; therefore, it is not possible to include one in the FAIP. Had one been approved the SOs state they would have published it in the FAIP.</p>			

Capacity Auction Monitor's Comments

We consider this to be non-compliant with CMC E.8.1.1. The Participant submitted values to more than 3 decimal places so therefore the SOs needed to amend the values. They did so without providing an amendment code.

We also consider this to be non-compliant with E.9.4.2 as the first part of this issue was raised in the Capacity Auction Monitor's Qualification report in IL008.

We do not consider this to have a material impact on the auction given it is a communication issue.

SOs Comments

The SOs confirm to the Capacity Auction Monitor that the issues for E.8.1.1 did not impact the auction as they did not impact the capacity to be offered into the Auction.

B.3. ISSUE LOG 018

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
018	2028/2029 T-4 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-compliant

Summary

CMC Section E.8.2 sets out the approach to calculating Gross De-Rated Capacity (Existing). For several Generator Units, the value of Gross De-Rated Capacity (Existing) in the FQRs does not align with the values calculated through the application of the formula outlined in this section of the CMC.

All of the CMUs identified in this issue log were previously brought to the SOs attention – in Issue Log 006 of the Capacity Auction Monitor’s report on the 2028/29 T-4 Qualification process. CMC E.9.4.2 requires the SOs to correct such PQR issues for the issuance of FQRs, but did not do so in this case.

Description of Issue

CMC E.8.2.1 outlines the formula to be used in calculating the Existing Gross De-Rated Capacity (GDRCE) of a Generator Unit (other than an Aggregated Generator Unit) which is a not Variable Generator Unit.

For the below Generator Units, the Gross De-Rated Capacity (Existing) does not align with the value calculated by the Capacity Auction Monitor, as per the formula in CMC E.8.2.1 using components from the PQRs and Participants’ Application for Qualification (AfQ).

CMU ID	Unit Type	Variable Unit Classification	GDRCE (PQRs) (MWs)	GDRCE (FQRs) (MWs)	Calculated as per CMC E.8.2.1 (MWs)
[X]	Other Storage	Not Variable	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	Demand Side Unit	Not Variable	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	Demand Side Unit	Not Variable	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	Demand Side Unit	Not Variable	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	Other Storage	Not Variable	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	Demand Side Unit	Not Variable	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	Demand Side Unit	Not Variable	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	Other Storage	Not Variable	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	Demand Side Unit	Not Variable	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	Demand Side Unit	Not Variable	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	Demand Side Unit	Not Variable	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	Demand Side Unit	Not Variable	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	Demand Side Unit	Not Variable	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	Demand Side Unit	Not Variable	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	Demand Side Unit	Not Variable	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	Demand Side Unit	Not Variable	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	Other Storage	Not Variable	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	Demand Side Unit	Not Variable	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	Demand Side Unit	Not Variable	[X]	[X]	[X]

Capacity Auction Monitor’s Comments

We consider this to be non-compliance with CMC E.8.2.1.

We also consider this to be non-compliance with E.9.4.2 as this issue was raised in IL006 of the Capacity Auction Monitor's Qualification Report.

We note that the difference between the Capacity Auction Monitor's calculation applying E.8.2.1 and the GDRCE reported in FQRs are small (to 1 decimal place) and appear to be rounding differences. Therefore, we determine that there was no material impact on the auction.

B.4. ISSUE LOG 019

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
019	2028/2029 T-4 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-compliant

Summary

CMC section E.8.2.4 sets out how the SOs shall determine the Gross De-Rated Capacity (New) (GDRCN) of a Generator Unit or Interconnector. For several units, the GDRCN has not been determined according to the Capacity Market Code.

Description of Issue

CMC E.8.2.4 states the following:

“The System Operators shall determine the Gross De-Rated Capacity (New) of a Generator Unit or Interconnector (other than an Aggregated Generator Unit) which is not a Variable Generator Unit in accordance with the following formula:

$$GDRCN = MAX[0, MIN[DRFT \times ADRFT \times ICT \times (1 + INCTOL), MAX[DRFT \times ADRFT \times ICT \times (1 - DECTOL), NDRVE + NDRVN]] - GDRCE]”$$

For the following units, the GDRCN determined by the SOs in the FQRs does not align with the value calculated by the Capacity Auction Monitor when applying the formula as per CMC E.8.2.4. We have included information on the changes between the PQRs and FQRs which we believe should have been explained by a qualification note.

For four of these units (highlighted in orange) this issue also existed in the PQRs and was raised in the Capacity Auction Monitor’s Qualification Report under IL010. These appear to be rounding differences.

For the additional units, this is a new issue and we have provided a short summary of what has changed for these units between PQRs and FQRs.

CMU ID	GDRCN (FQRs) (MWs)	GDRCN (Capacity Auction Monitor calculation) (MWs)	Description of change between PQRs and FQRs
[X]	[X]	[X]	
[X]	[X]	[X]	
[X]	[X]	[X]	
[X]	[X]	[X]	
[X]	[X]	[X]	Unit was not checked at Qualification stage as unit was rejected in PQRs. Unit changed from rejected to accepted between PQRs and FQRs.
[X]	[X]	[X]	Unit was not checked at Qualification stage as unit was rejected in PQRs. Unit changed from rejected to accepted between PQRs and FQRs.
[X]	[X]	[X]	Unit was not checked at Qualification stage as unit was rejected in PQRs. Unit changed from rejected to accepted between PQRs and FQRs.
[X]	[X]	[X]	Gross De-rated Capacity New was reported in PQRs as [X]. It has now changed in FQRs to [X].

Capacity Auction Monitor’s Comments

We consider this to be non-compliant with CMC E.8.2.4.

We also consider this to be non-compliance with E.9.4.2.(c), as this issue was raised in IL010 of the Capacity Auction Monitor's Qualification Report, and errors in PQRs should have been corrected.

We note that the difference between the Capacity Auction Monitor's calculation applying E.8.2.4 and the GDRCN reported in FQRs are small (often to 1 decimal place) and appear to be rounding differences. Therefore, we determine that there was no material impact on the auction.

The SOs explained to the Capacity Auction Monitor that the changes to [~~3~~] were due to an update from the participant for the Hours of Duration, however no "Amend Code" was provided in the FQRs to explain this change.

B.5. ISSUE LOG 020

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
020	2028/2029 T-4 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-Compliant
Summary			
<p>For the 2028/2029 T-4 Capacity Auction, the notification of the outcome of the Applications for Review was not completed by the SOs within the Prescribed Timeframe as set out within the applicable version of the Capacity Auction Timetable at the time (version 1.1), resulting in non-compliance with code E.9.3.5 of the CMC.</p>			
Description of Issue			
<p>CMC Section E.9.3 relates to the Reconsideration of Provisional SO Qualification Decision which is done through the Application for Review process. CMC E.9.3.5 states that:</p> <p><i>“The System Operators shall reconsider the Reviewable Decision the subject of an Application for Review and shall within the Prescribed Timeframe of receiving the Application for Review notify the Participant lodging the application of the outcome of the reconsideration.”</i></p> <p>For the 2028/2029 T-4 Capacity Auction, the Prescribed Timeframe for the System Operators notifying participants of the outcome of their Application for Review was 04/09/2024, as per version 1.1 of the Capacity Auction Timetable. This date was unchanged from version 1.0 of the Capacity Auction Timetable. However, the outcome for all Applications for Review was provided to participants on 06/09/2024, two days behind the timeframe set out within the timetable.</p> <p>While we are aware that the initial submission deadline for Applications for Review for this auction was extended, there was no formal extension to the timeframe for the notification of the outcome of the SOs decisions. Therefore, this constitutes non-compliance with E.9.3.5.</p>			
Capacity Auction Monitor’s Comments			
<p>We consider this to be non-compliance with CMC E.9.3.5, although we note that this did not have an impact on the auction and that there were a relatively large number of Applications for Review for the SOs to review for this auction.</p>			

B.6. ISSUE LOG 021

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
021	2028/2029 T-4 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-Compliant

Summary

For a number of units, the SOs determined Firm Offer Requirement values that are not compliant with CMC E.8.5.1.

Description of Issue

CMC E.8.5.1 sets out the calculation of the Firm Offer Requirement (FOR) for AGUs, and other units that are not DSUs (or are not combined units made up of DSUs).

It sets out that the FOR shall be the greater of 0 and the CMUs De-rated Firm Network Access Capacity (FNAC) less any Awarded Capacity.

We found a number of cases where the calculation is not compliant with CMC E.8.5.1.

For ease, we set out our findings in three sections.

First, for units that are not AGUs, CAUs or DSUs, the Capacity Auction Monitor cannot replicate the FOR value in the FQRs based on calculations set out in E.8.5.1 for three units. For this calculation, we used the FNAC and FNAC de-rating factors shared with the Capacity Auction Monitor in an internal SOs workings spreadsheet, as well as checking for de-rating factor values set out in the IAIP. The calculation steps are shown in the table below. We find that the Net FOR in the FQRs (final column) is not equal to the value calculated by the Capacity Auction Monitor (penultimate column).

Generator ID	FNAC (Generator Level) (MWs)	FNAC DRF (Generator Level) (MWs)	De-rated FNAC (MWs)	Existing Awarded Capacity (MWs)	New Awarded Capacity (MWs)	Net FOR as per E.8.5.1 (MWs)	Net FOR as reported in the FQRs (MWs)
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]

Second, for three CAUs, we cannot replicate the FOR value in the FQRs based on calculations set out in E.8.5.1 using FNAC and FNAC de-rating factors set out to the Capacity Auction Monitor by the SOs. The calculation steps are show in the table below. We find that the Net FOR in the FQRs (final column in the grey rows) is not equal to the value calculated by the Capacity Auction Monitor (penultimate column).

CMU ID	Generator Unit ID	FNAC (Generator Level) (MWs)	FNAC DRF (Generator Level) (MWs)	De-rated FNAC (MWs)	E.8.5.1 Awarded Capacity (CAU level) (MWs)	E.8.5.1 Derated FNAC-Awarded Capacity (CAU level) (MWs)	Net FOR as reported in the FQRs (MWs)
[X]				[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]			
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]			

[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]

Capacity Auction Monitor's Comments

We consider this to be non-compliance with CMC E.8.5.1.
 We cannot be certain that the instances identified in this Issue Log did not have an impact on the auction. The inputs we have used to replicate these calculations have come from a workings file and therefore may not be what the SOs deemed the final values.

B.7. ISSUE LOG 023

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
023	2028/2029 T-4 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-Compliant

Summary

CMC section E.8.2.5 sets out how the SOs shall determine the Gross De-Rated Capacity (New) of a Generator Unit or Interconnector. For one unit, the GDRCN has not been determined correctly.

Description of Issue

CMC E.8.2.5 states the following:

“The System Operators shall determine the Gross De-Rated Capacity (New) of a Generator Unit or Interconnector (other than an Aggregated Generator Unit) which is not a Variable Generator Unit in accordance with the following formula:

$$\text{GDRCN} = \text{MAX}[0, \text{MIN}[\text{DRFT} \times \text{ADRFT} \times \text{ICT} \times (1 + \text{INCTOL}), \text{NDRVE} + \text{NDRVN}] - \text{GDRCE}]$$

For the following unit, the GDRCN determined by the SOs in the FQRs does not align with the value calculated by the Capacity Auction Monitor when applying the formula as per CMC E.8.2.5.

CMU ID	GDRCN (FQRs) (MWs)	GDRCN (Monitor calculation) (MWs)
[X]	[X]	[X]

This unit was brought to the attention of the SOs at the PQR stage in the Capacity Auction Monitor’s Qualification Report.

Capacity Auction Monitor’s Comments

We consider this to be non-compliance with CMC E.8.2.5.

We note we do not believe this to have had a material impact on the auction given the difference is to 1 decimal place and appears to be a rounding difference.

B.8. ISSUE LOG 024

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
024	2028/2029 T-4 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-Compliant

Summary

We have found issues of non-compliance with the CMC relating to the determination of Existing Capacity in the Final Qualification Results.

CMC Sections E.8.2.7 and E.8.2.8 provide the formulas to be used in the determination of Gross De-Rated Capacity (Existing) and Gross De-Rated Capacity (New) of Aggregated Generator Units. For several Aggregated Generator Units, the Gross De-Rated Capacity values within the FQRs do not align with the values calculated through the application of the formulas of these sections.

CMC Section E.8.3.1 provides the approach for calculating the Net De-rated Capacity Existing. We find one unit where the values in the FQRs do not align with the values calculated through the application of the formulas outlined in this paragraph.

Description of Issue

CMC E.8.2.7 outlines the formula to be used in calculating the Gross De-Rated Capacity Existing (GDRCE) of an Aggregated Generator Unit.

For the below Generator Unit, the GDRCE does not align with the value calculated by the Capacity Auction Monitor, as per the formula in CMC E.8.2.7, using components from the FQRs and Participants' Application for Qualification (AfQ).

Generator Unit ID	GDRCE and Firm Offer Requirements in Participant's Application (MWs)	GDRCE (FQRs) (MWs)	Calculated as per CMC E.8.2.7 (MWs)
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

CMC E.8.2.8 outlines the formula to be used in calculating the Gross De-Rated Capacity New (GDRCN) of an Aggregated Generator Unit.

For the below Generator Unit, the GDRCN does not align with the value calculated by the Capacity Auction Monitor, as per the formula in CMC E.8.2.8, using components from the FQRs and Participants' Application for Qualification (AfQ).

Generator Unit ID	GDRCN in Participant's Application (MWs)	GDRCN (FQRs) (MWs)	Calculated as per CMC E.8.2.8 (MWs)
[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]

E.8.3.1 (d) states the Net De-Rated Capacity (Existing) that is Qualified to participate in the Capacity Auction is the greater of zero and the Gross De-Rated Capacity (Existing) less Awarded Capacity from prior Capacity Auctions in respect of Existing Capacity. For one CAU, we found the NDRCE is not set equal to the greater of

zero and the GDRCE less Awarded Capacity. This also affects the value calculated for the net FOR (as shown below).

CMU ID	GU ID	GDRCE (GU level) (MWs)	Existing Awarded Capacity (MWs)	NDRCE (GU level) (MWs)	Net FOR (GU level) (MWs)
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
Total	(CMU level)	[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]

This SOs acknowledged that the Net FOR and NDRCE values presented in the CMP export were incorrect. The SOs explained that an error occurred in the CMP where there were multiple copies of some of the generators which make up this combined unit. The impact of this was that the CMP was counting the NDRCE and net FOR incorrectly for some of the individual Generator Units (highlighted in orange in the above table) that formed part of [X]. This issue did not affect the gross values.

The SOs were aware of this issue at the time of FQRs and made a manual override to the NDRCE prior to the Participant being able to submit a bid, limiting the participant to offering in only a maximum of [X] MWs, avoiding an impact on the Auction.

Capacity Auction Monitor’s Comments

We consider this to be non-compliance with CMC E.8.2.7, E.8.2.8 and E.8.3.1.

For E.8.3.1, the SOs took action through by manually changing the FOR values in the CMP such that there was no impact on the size of the offer that this unit would bid into the auction. For E.8.2.7 and E.8.2.8, the small differences between our calculated values and the FQR values mean that there should be no material impact on the auction.

B.9. ISSUE LOG 025

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
025	2028/2029 T-4 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-Compliant
Summary			
The SOs did not reduce the Locational Capacity Constraint (LCC) Required Quantity to the Total Quantity determined under paragraph F.4.1.1.(b), as is required under CMC F.4.1.6.			
Description of Issue			
<p>Under paragraph F.4.1.1. (b), the SOs are required to determine the total quantity of Gross De-Rated Capacity in respect of Capacity Market Units that are Qualified as contributing to satisfying the LCC.</p> <p>Under paragraph F.4.1.1. (c), the SOs are required to determine the absolute value of the amount by which the value determined under F.4.1.1. (b) falls short of the LCC Required Capacity.</p> <p>CMC F.4.1.6 requires the SOs to reduce the LCC Required Quantity to the total quantity determined under paragraph F.4.1.1. (b) if the value determined under paragraph F.4.1.1. (c) is greater than zero.</p> <p>The value determined under F.4.1.1. (c) is greater than zero for the Northern Ireland LCC, but the SOs did not reduced the Required Quantity as is required under CMC F.4.1.6.</p>			
Capacity Auction Monitor's Comments			
<p>We consider this to be non-compliance with CMC F.4.1.6.</p> <p>We note that this did not have an impact on the 2028/29 T-4 Capacity Market Auction, as it did not affect the quantity that could be procured for the LCC in this auction. The SOs indicated to us that the reason that they did not reduce the LCC Required Quantity, as is required under F.4.1.6, was to notify the RAs of the shortfall. However, CMC F.4.1.7 requires the SOs to notify the RAs of any changes made under F.4.1.6.</p> <p>We recommend that a CMC modification is introduced to remove the requirement under CMC F.4.1.6 if the intention is to not apply this paragraph.</p>			

[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]
[X]	[X]	[X]	[X]

Capacity Auction Monitor's Comments

We consider this to be non-compliant with E.9.4.11. Although communication of the changes is required by the CMC, the Capacity Auction Monitor does not consider any instances where the lack of communication regarding the above changes would have had an impact on the auction.

B.12. ISSUE LOG 028

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
028	2028/2029 T-4 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-Compliant

Summary

Section E.7.8 of the CMC outlines the Alternative Qualification Process (AQP) which the SOs are to apply under certain circumstances. In the FQRs, the SOs have not applied this process in some instances in accordance with E.7.8.2.

Description of Issue

CMC E.7.8.2 outlines the requirements for the SOs to determine Qualification Decisions for units which have undergone the AQP. In the remainder of this Issue Log, we highlight several Qualification Decisions that we find are non-compliant with the requirements under E.7.8.2 (specifically parts f, h and i of this CMC paragraph).

CMC E.7.8.2 (f) requires the SOs, when applying the AQP, to set the Gross De-Rated Capacity (Existing), in the case of a Demand Side Unit or a Variable Generator Unit, equal to the volume of any Awarded Capacity associated with that unit for the Capacity Year in respect of Existing Capacity.

For the below Generator Unit, that had the AQP applied, the SOs did not set the Gross De-Rated Capacity (Existing) equal to Existing Awarded Capacity in the Final Qualification Results, relayed to Participants via the CMP. This unit was Rejected in the Provisional Qualification Decisions; therefore, this is a new issue that was not included in the Capacity Auction Monitor's Qualification Report.

CMU ID	Gross De-Rated Capacity (Existing) (FQRs)	Existing Awarded Capacity (FQRs)
[X]	[X]	[X]

Similarly to the above, CMC E.7.8.2 (h) requires the SOs to, when applying the AQP, set the Gross De-Rated Capacity (New), in the case of a Demand Side Unit or a Variable Generator Unit, equal to the volume of any Awarded Capacity associated with that unit for the Capacity Year in respect of New Capacity. This was not followed for [X]. This issue was raised in the Capacity Auction Monitor's Qualification Report (under IL009).

CMU ID	Gross De-Rated Capacity (New) (FQRs)	New Awarded Capacity (FQRs)
[X]	[X]	[X]

In the two above instances, the SOs informed us that this issue only occurs in the Final Qualification Decisions published on the CMP and that these issues were corrected in the version of the Final Qualification Decisions sent to and approved by the RAs. However, we still consider this to be non-compliance with the above codes, given that the values sent to the Participants were incorrect.

CMC E.7.8.2 (i) states that the Maximum Capacity Duration determined will be 1 year for all units that undergo the Alternative Qualification Process. We observe that in the FQRs, one unit that was qualified through the AQP was assigned a Maximum Capacity Duration of 5 years.

CMU ID	Existing Maximum Capacity Duration
[X]	5 years

For this unit, [X], the SOs confirmed that the RAs approved an Exception Application for a 5-year Maximum Capacity Duration for this unit. However, we find that this non-compliant with E.7.8.2, given that the CMC AQP provisions do not make any reference to Exception Applications.

Capacity Auction Monitor's Comments

We consider this to be non-compliance with E.7.8.2. For [X] and [X], this issue had no impact on the auction outcome, as the Net De-rated Capacity (Existing) in the case of [X], and the Net De-rated Capacity (New) in the case of [X], would have been zero anyway.

In the case of [X], the unit was awarded a 5-year contract in the auction therefore the decision to assign a Maximum Capacity Duration of 5 years had a material impact on the capacity contract duration for this unit, but not on the auction clearing price and quantity.

We recommend that the CMC is amended to clarify the treatment of units that undergo the AQP but also have Exception Applications related to contract duration or price caps approved by the RAs.

B.13. ISSUE LOG 029

Issue ID	Affected auction(s)	Issue status	Compliance status
029	2028/2029 T-4 Capacity Auction	Closed	Non-Compliant
Summary			
We find instances of non-compliance with F.4.1.4 and F.4.1.5, relating to the submission of Locational Capacity Constraint (LCC) determinations to the RAs.			
Description of Issue			
<p>Under CMC F.4.1.1, the SOs shall determine the LCCs as required by section F.4.1. However, we find that under CMC F.4.1.4., no submission was made, and under CMC F.4.1.5, the submission was later than required.</p> <p>CMC F.4.1.1 states that:</p> <p><i>“The System Operators shall make a determination under paragraph F.4.1.1 based on the Provisional SO Qualification Decisions and submit the values to the Regulatory Authorities no later than two Working Days after the Provisional Qualification Results Date.”</i></p> <p>We note that no such LCC determination was made based on the Provisional Qualification Decisions, and was therefore not submitted two Working Days after the Provisional Qualification Results Date (14th August 2024).</p> <p>CMC F.4.1.5 states that:</p> <p><i>“The System Operators shall make a determination under paragraph F.4.1.1 based on the Final Qualification Decisions and submit the values to the Regulatory Authorities at the same time as submitting the Final Qualification Decisions under paragraph E.9.4.3.”</i></p> <p>Whilst the Final Qualification Decisions were submitted on the 15th October 2024, the LCC determination based on the Final Qualification Decisions was submitted 3 Working Days later, on the 18th October 2024.</p>			
Capacity Auction Monitor’s Comments			
<p>We therefore determine these to be cases of non-compliance with F.4.1.4 and F.4.1.5.</p> <p>The determination of LCCs based on FQRs under F4.1.1 was delivered later than scheduled, but this had no impact on the Auction. In addition the determination of F.4.1.1 based on PQRs would not have fed into the auction and therefore also had no impact on the Auction.</p>			



UK

Queens House
55-56 Lincoln's Inn Fields
London WC2A 3LJ

T. **+44 (0)20 7269 0210**

E. **info@cepa.co.uk**

www.cepa.co.uk

 **cepa-ltd**  **@cepaltd**

Australia

Level 20, Tower 2 Darling Park
201 Sussex St
Sydney NSW2000

T. **+61 2 9006 1307**

E. **info@cepa.net.au**

www.cepa.net.au